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Abstract 
This paper investigates how changes in European banks’ credit risk affect their host countries’ 
sovereign risk by exploring bank-to-sovereign rating spillover effects. Using credit rating data 
from Standard & Poor’s, Moody’s, and Fitch for the period ranging from 2002 to 2016, we 
identify both positive and negative bank-to-sovereign spillover effects, and find the negative 
rating spillover effect to be more pronounced than the positive one. Further, we provide 
evidence on differences among the three rating agencies in terms of the occurrence of positive 
spillovers, and the degree of negative spillovers. Our results are robust to the changes in 
model specifications with respect to the currency type of ratings, the structure of regression 
models, and the approach used to link bank and sovereign ratings. Overall, our analysis sheds 
new light on how information related to systemic risks emanating from the banking sector 
affects domestic sovereign credit ratings, and thereby complements previous research 
focusing on the opposite sovereign-to-bank rating transmission channel.  
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The 2007-2009 global financial crisis (GFC) vividly demonstrated how financial market 
shocks combined with high levels of interconnectedness among banks and interdependence 
between banks and countries can trigger macroeconomic downturns (De Bruyckere et al., 
2013). As several European governments made considerable efforts to rescue troubled banks, 
they transferred private banking sector risks to sovereign treasuries and public budget deficits 
increased. Likewise, increasing sovereign credit risk burdened financial institutions mainly 
through four different transmission channels: first, banks’ holdings of sovereign debt and 
derivative securities; second, collateral used for obtaining external wholesale funding and 
central bank refinancing; third, implicit and explicit government guarantees; fourth, sovereign 
rating downgrades which contribute to a deterioration in domestic or foreign banks’ 
creditworthiness (BIS, 2011). Consequently, in the aftermath of the GFC understanding and 
managing the manifold sources of systemic credit risk became a focal point of subsequent 
public policy actions, as well as academic research (Giglio et al., 2016). 
In this paper, we concern with the relationship between sovereign credit ratings and 
domestic bank credit ratings in terms of credit risk spillover. Numerous studies show that 
there is a sovereign-to-banking rating spillover effect through the sovereign ceiling channel 
(see Williams et al., 2013; Alsakka et al., 2014; Poon et al., 2017; Klusak et al., 2017; 
Almeida et al. 2017; among others). However, few papers, if not none, examine the opposite 
direction, i.e. the rating spillover from banks to sovereigns.  
We argue the opposite direction also holds for the following reasons. Firstly, previous 
literature suggests there are strong linkages between a country’s financial sector and its 
macroeconomic status. Allen et al. (2012) note that high levels of systemic risk in the banking 
sector leads to aggregate lending activity, which further impacts the financial health of the 
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overall economy. Giglio et al., 2016 how the developments in banking sector can affect 
macroeconomic and fiscal outcomes. Gilchrist et al. (2009) and Gilchrist and Zakrajšek 
(2012) argue that credit market shocks have contributed significantly to US economic 
fluctuations. Furthermore, Schularick and Taylor (2012) show that leverage ratio can forecast 
future GDP growth in crisis. Therefore, the creditworthiness of a country’s banking sector 
could possibly be a good indicator of its sovereign credit risk. 
Secondly, prior contributions also confirm a two-way credit risk interdependence 
between banking industry and sovereign sector measured by credit default swap (CDS) 
spreads. Alter and Schüler (2012) and Merler and Pisani-Ferry (2012) show that changes in 
sovereign CDS spreads have a significant impact on bank default risks and vice versa during 
and after government interventions. Both CDS and credit rating measure the creditworthiness 
of an entity so that we believe similar relationship can also be found in credit ratings.  
Finally, in particular for European debt crisis, Acharya et al. (2014) show that greater 
financial sector distress leads to a larger scale of bank bailouts, which in turn results in higher 
sovereign credit risk. Angelini et al. (2014) introduce the self-reinforcing negative spiral 
among sovereign difficulties, bank fragility and economic recession. While risks arising from 
a European sovereign borrower can be transmitted to the country’s banking sector, there is 
also some evidence on the bank-to-sovereign causality direction during the European 
sovereign debt crisis: The Irish and Spanish government debt sectors suffered from the 
financial obstacles of the domestic banking industry. 
Motivated by the reasons above, we argue there is a bank-to-sovereign rating spillover 
effect and investigate three main questions against the background of the European sovereign 
debt crisis. Since European sovereigns have incurred substantial costs from bank bailout 
decisions, these countries’ credit ratings should be negatively affected by a large scope of 
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deterioration in their domestic bank industry’s creditworthiness. Firstly, we examine whether, 
and to which extent, changes in a European country’s bank credit ratings influence sovereign 
ratings. Secondly, we test whether the outbreak of European sovereign debt crisis leads to a 
structural change in the intensity of rating spillover effect. Thirdly, as recent literature 
indicates that distinct opinions among the leading credit rating agencies (CRA) on sovereign 
ratings have become prevalent in Europe in the post-crisis era (Vu et al., 2015; Alsakka et al., 
2017; Abad et al., 2018), we also study the differences in the level of bank-to-sovereign 
spillover effects among S&P, Moody’s, and Fitch.   
Our paper contributes to several strands of the literature. Our primary contribution is 
to document bank-to-sovereign credit rating spillover. Previous literature (i.e. Alsaka et al. 
2014;  Almeida et al., 2017) only shows a sovereign to bank credit rating channel while we 
find the opposite direction also holds. This suggests a bilateral relationship between bank and 
sovereign credit ratings. Our paper also contributes to the linkages between a country’s 
financial sector and its macroeconomic risks. Although the bank-to-sovereign risk 
transmission mechanism in the EU has been confirmed by previous contributions using CDS 
data (Acharya et al., 2014), we extend the empirical examination to credit ratings for the 
following reasons. Firstly, the European bank rating data has a much larger coverage than the 
bank CDS data. Secondly, Oehmke and Zawadowski (2017) suggest that speculative trading 
concentres in CDS markets and CDS spreads are noisy while trading in bond markets is 
mainly hedging motivated. Therefore, credit ratings could provide better information about 
the domestic banking sector’s overall creditworthiness.  
To this end, we employ a comprehensive rating sample of 439 banks from 28 
countries rated by S&P, 343 banks from 28 countries rated by Moody’s, and 690 banks from 
26 countries rated by Fitch. In brief, our empirical outcomes confirm that both positive and 
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negative bank-to-sovereign spillover effects exist, and the negative rating spillover is more 
pronounced than the positive one. Against the background of European debt crisis, the results 
also show that the severity of positive and negative rating transmission effects is different and 
depends upon pre-crisis/crisis-and-post-crisis periods and the origin countries. Moreover, 
there is evidence on agency-related differences with respect to the existence of positive 
spillover effects and the degree of negative spillover effects.  
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the data, while 
section 3 introduces the methodology. In section 4 we present the empirical findings, and in 
section 5 we show the results of further robustness checks. Our conclusions are presented in 
section 6. 
2. Data  
Sovereign and bank credit rating data used in this study are from S&P, Moody’s, and Fitch 
over the period from January 2002 to December 2016. Our sample starts from 2002 because 
Euro notes and coins were introduced to replace all national currencies in Eurozone on 1st 
January 2002 and European Monetary Union (EMU) officially established. The three years 
before 2002 is the transition periods and we want to avoid the impact of establishing EMU in 
this study. These three CRAs together have over 90% market share of the European credit 
rating industry (ESMA, 2015). We focus on long-term foreign-currency issuer ratings 
including watch status for sovereigns and banks, and additionally incorporating the outlook 
placements for sovereigns. According to Standard and Poor’s (2017), a foreign-currency 
credit rating indicates an issuer’s capacity to fulfil its obligations denominated in a foreign 
currency. Moody’s (2015) emphasizes that a bank’s foreign-currency deposit ratings are 
subject to sovereign ceilings and typically lower than its domestic currency ratings. Although 
foreign-currency ratings have taken the currency risk associated with sovereign actions into 
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account and constitute a more precise risk measure (Prati et al., 2012), we also employ the 
long-term domestic-currency rating data for robustness check.    
The sovereign rating signals (including watch and outlook placements) issued by 
Moody’s and Fitch are manually collected from their publications, while the sovereign rating 
data of Standard & Poor’s are extracted from the S&P Global Credit Portal database. The 
primary sovereign rating sample covers all 28 member countries of the EU. The data source 
of bank ratings is Bloomberg. Bank ratings are included in our sample if they meet both the 
following two criteria: first, the issuer is classified as a bank located in one of the member 
countries of the EU; second, the issuer has been rated by at least one of the ‘Big Three’ CRAs 
during the sample period 2002-2016. To ensure sufficient quality and completeness of bank 
rating data, we further match the Bloomberg rating data with bank rating history obtained 
from Datastream Eikon and delete ambiguous entries. This selection procedure leads to a 
comprehensive sample of 1088 European banks from 28 countries.  
(Insert Table 1) 
Table 1 shows that the final pooled data sample consists of 1584 bank rating upgrades 
and 2640 downgrades issued by the three CRAs. During the whole sample period, the 
European countries received 167 sovereign rating upgrades and 200 downgrades. Panel B of 
Table 1 presents macroeconomic explanatory variables that are used in later sensitivity tests. 
Typing in with (Cantor and Packer, 1997) and Hill et al. (2010), we collect GDP per capita, 
GDP growth, inflation rate, current account balance, fiscal balance, and external debt from the 
World Bank’s World Development Indicators database. Apart from GDP per capita, which is 
measured in thousands of US dollars, all other macroeconomic variables are presented as 
percentages in our dataset.  
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In line with Alsakka and ap Gwilym (2013), sovereign and bank ratings are 
transformed into cardinal values according to a 20-point numerical scale ranging from 20 
(Aaa/AAA) to 1 (C/SD-D). Furthermore, the end-of-month sovereign and bank rating datasets 
are extended to a balanced and an unbalanced monthly panel, respectively. Within the sample 
period, we are able to capture a full rating history for all sovereigns by recognizing the period 
between two successive sovereign rating actions as the months with no rating signal, and 
hence set up a balanced monthly panel for sovereign ratings. By contrast to the sovereigns, a 
number of European banks do not have a complete rating record over the whole sample period 
2002-2016. For example, if a bank received its first rating signal in May 2008 in our dataset, 
it is only possible to generate a monthly time series starting from May 2008.  
(Insert Table 2) 
Table 2 illustrates a breakdown of our pooled sovereign and bank rating sample by 
rating agency. Panel A shows the distribution of end-of-month long-term foreign currency 
ratings (for both sovereigns and banks) as well as watch list and outlook signals (only for 
sovereigns) for the pre-crisis period (Jan 2002 - Dec 2008). Panel B illustrates the same 
sample statistics as in Panel A but for the crisis and post-crisis period (Jan 2009 - Dec 2016). 
Comparing Panel A and Panel B for each CRA subsample, we can find that i) both sovereigns 
and banks received more downgrades in the crisis and post-crisis period than in the pre-crisis 
period; ii) the proportion of banks and sovereigns that received no rating signals is higher in 
the pre-crisis period, which indicates that the CRAs issue rating signals more frequently since 
the outbreak of the European crisis; and iii) there are more downgrades than upgrades on both 
banks and sovereigns during the crisis and post-crisis period. For instance, focusing on the 
S&P subsample, there are 13 (157) sovereign (bank) downgrades before the crisis, but 67 
(811) sovereign (bank) downgrades during the crisis and post-crisis period. After the outbreak 
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of the sovereign debt crisis in 2009, the percentage of sovereigns (banks) that received no 
rating signals decreased from 96.9% (95.9%) to 94.4% (91.1%). In the same period, 67 (35) 
downgrades (upgrades) were issued on European sovereigns, whilst 811 (135) downgrades 
(upgrades) were released on European banks.  
Previous research employs different dates as starting points of the European sovereign 
debt crisis (see e.g. Beirne and Fratzscher, 2013; Bhanot et al., 2014; Caselli et al., 2016). We 
take January 2009 as the starting month of the European sovereign debt crisis and include the 
time period afterwards as a part of the ongoing crisis for two reasons: first, the GIIPS 
countries (Greece, Italy, Ireland, Portugal and Spain) reported substantial increases in fiscal 
deficit levels in 2009 (Lane, 2012), while European banks start to increase sovereign debt 
holdings of their origin country in the first quarter of 2009 (Singh et al., 2016); second, the 
bank-to-sovereign contagion effect and feedback loop is relevant for the European countries 
throughout the crisis period until at least 2015 (Vergote, 2016). 
The main hypothesis underlying our study is that the systemic risk of a European 
country’s domestic banking sector is transmitted to the sovereign sector through the credit 
rating channel. In order to investigate the bank-to-sovereign rating spillover effect, we have to 
define a maximal time span between a sovereign rating signal and the most recent bank rating 
action. In line with previous contributions which study the impact of sovereign rating changes 
on bank ratings such like Williams et al. (2013) and Alsakka et al. (2014), we similarly apply 
a 3-month linkage rule to the sovereign rating dataset by generating a linkage between 
sovereign and bank ratings issued by the same CRA. As a result, any sovereign rating 
observation which is more than three months later than the most recent bank rating signals 
(upgrade, downgrade or watch list placement) is omitted. 
(Insert Table 3) 
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Throughout our analyses we distinguish between GIIPS and non-GIIPS countries to 
account for respective differences. This is because the government bond yield spreads 
between GIIPS countries and other countries (e.g., Germany and France) became considerable 
widen since 2009. This indicates strong economic divergence between the two groups of 
countries (Acharya and Steffen, 2015). Therefore, most of previous studies on European debt 
crisis split the sample into GIPPS and non-GIIPS countries (e.g. Acharya and Steffen, 2015; 
De Bruyeckere et al. 2013; Alsakka et al., 2014). Panels A and B of Table 3 summarize both 
subsamples characteristics. Sovereign rating upgrades (downgrades) are classified as single- 
or multiple-notch upgrades (downgrades). Bank rating upgrades (downgrades), which are 
issued within a 3-month period before the sovereign rating signal, are categorized as single 
and multiple upgrades (downgrades), respectively. No bank rating change means that at least 
one bank linked with sovereign rating is either put on the watch list or taken off watch status. 
Applying the 3-month linkage rule, there are more sovereign downgrades linked with bank 
rating actions than sovereign upgrades among both the GIIPS and the non-GIIPS countries. 
The CRAs took more rating actions in the GIIPS countries: the percentage of no rating change 
on the non-GIIPS sovereigns (banks) was 97% (17.1%), whereas the percentage of that on the 
GIIPS sovereigns (banks) was 93.0% (13.1%). In sum, sovereign downgrades of the GIIPS 
countries were substantially more frequent and more severe than downgrades of the other 
European countries. 
3. Methodology 
We investigate the bank-to-sovereign rating transmission channel among European countries 
based on an ordered probit model, which is widely accepted in credit ratings literature (see e.g. 
Alsakka and ap Gwilym, 2010; Caporale et al., 2012; Williams et al., 2013). The discrete and 
ordinal nature of credit ratings makes ordered probit regression an appropriate tool to estimate 
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the probability of sovereign upgrades, or downgrades, or rating stability following bank rating 
changes. 
In most of the cases, a sovereign rating signal included in our sample is associated 
with more than one bank rating action (upgrade or downgrade) issued during the previous 
three months. We record the number of bank upgrades and the number of bank downgrades 
issued within a 3-month period, respectively, to account for the potential systemic effect of 
multiple bank rating changes in the same direction. The underlying assumption is that the 
more rating upgrades (downgrades) are issued to the banking sector of a European country 
within a 3-month period, the more likely the sovereign will receive an upgrade (downgrade) 
due to the bank-to-sovereign spillover effect.  
We distinguish sovereign rating changes according to the number of rating steps (0, 1, 
and 2 or more notches) based on the 20-point rating scale. Following Alsakka et al. (2014), 
we take two dummy variables to represent single and multiple bank rating changes which are 
linked with the following sovereign rating, respectively. The reason is that the impact of a 
single bank rating upgrade (downgrade) on domestic sovereign rating may be different from 
that of multiple bank upgrades (downgrades), since the latter may indicate changes in the 
national banking sector’s systemic credit risk.1 In line with the recent literature in credit rating 
which suggests that positive and negative rating actions are driven by distinct factors (see e.g. 
Afonso et al., 2012; Poon et al., 2017; Williams et al., 2013), we investigate bank-to-
sovereign rating contagion effects separately for sovereign upgrades and downgrades: 
                                                 
1 Multiple bank rating upgrades (downgrades) refer to two or more domestic bank upgrades (downgrades) within a 3-month 
period prior to the sovereign rating signal. Due to the limited amount of cases in which more than three domestic banks are 
upgraded (downgraded) prior to the sovereign rating signal, we do not employ a third dummy to control three or more bank 
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where µm are the thresholds to be estimated using the maximum likelihood estimation 
(MLE), along with parameters αn and βn subject to the constraint µ1 < µ2. 
, , , ,
( )
i c t i c t
SUP SDN is an ordinal variable that takes the value of 1 if a sovereign i is 
upgraded (downgraded) by one notch by CRA c (S&P, Moody’s or Fitch) in month t; 2 if a 
sovereign i is upgraded (downgraded) by two or more notches by CRA c in month t; 0 
otherwise.  
, ,
_1 ( _1 )
i c i c
BANKUPNO BANKDNNO is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if 
there is one bank rating upgrade (downgrade) by CRA c in country i up to three months prior 




_ 2 ( _ 2 )
i c i c
BANKUPNO BANKDNNO  is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if 
there are two or more bank rating upgrades (downgrades) by CRA c in country i up to three 
months prior to month t; 0 otherwise.  
, , 1 1,2,...,19,20.i c tSovRat − =  It is the numerical rating notch of country i by CRA c in 
month t-1. The initial sovereign rating level is used to control for non-linearity and asymmetry 
in the bank-to-sovereign rating transmission. Moreover, it also accounts for the country’s 
economic and financial situation that is not controlled by the selected macroeconomic 
variables at the time of sovereign rating action.    
, ,i r ytMacro are a set of macroeconomic control variables of country i at time yt (the year 
of sovereign rating change), as described in Panel C of Table 1.  
iCo  consists of a full set of country dummies. 
tY  consists of a full set of year dummies. 
Eq. (1) and Eq. (2) are used for different test purposes as follows. First, based on the 
whole sample period (2002-2016) and all European countries, the upgrade model (Eq. (1)) 
and the downgrade model (Eq. (2)) are estimated by using pooled rating data from all three 
CRAs with two rating agency dummies to control the differences across the CRAs.2 Second, 
the sample is divided into the GIIPS subsample versus the non-GIIPS subsample in order to 
capture potential differences in spillover effects rooted in the GIIPS countries’ exposure to 
sovereign debt market turbulences during the observation period. Third, to account for 
potential structural changes in the bank-to-sovereign commission channel associated with the 
crisis, the models are separately estimated for the pre-crisis period versus the crisis and post-
                                                 
2 D-Fitch takes the value of 1 if Fitch assigns the given rating, while D-Moody takes the value of 1 if Moody’s assigns the 
given rating. Hereby S&P is used as the reference CRA.  
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crisis period. Fourth, our rating sample is further divided into three subsamples by rating 
agency to address the possible differentials among the three CRAs. Based on the regression 
analysis, we further calculate and present marginal effects (MEs) to test the economic 
significance of each independent variable.  
Our aim is to examine whether the bank-to-sovereign rating transmission channel 
exists in European countries. We expect multiple downgrades of a country’s local banks 
within a short period (no longer than three months) to have significantly negative effects on 
the respective sovereign ratings. Similarly, bank upgrades in countries may constitute good 
news for respective sovereign debt and therefore have a positive impact on sovereign ratings. 
Both the negative and positive spillover effects are expected to be more significant among 
European countries with moderate to low rating levels, since these sovereigns are justified by 
the respective CRA to own subordinate financial strengths. Because sovereign sectors of the 
GIIPS countries are increasingly volatile during the European sovereign debt crisis, we also 
forecast that negative bank-to-sovereign rating spillover effects in the GIIPS countries are 
more severe than in other European countries. Finally, the negative spillover effects are 
expected to be stronger during the crisis and post-crisis period than before the crisis.  
For the purpose of robustness check in terms of bank characteristics, we treat the bank 
rating signals issued to Systemically Important Financial Institutions (SIFIs) in a separate way 
compared to the rating signals issued to Normal Banks (NBs, i.e. non-SIFIs) in the regression 
analysis. SIFIs are banks which are included in the EBA 2011 or 2014 Stress Test, all of 
which stand out in terms of their size and/or interconnectedness, and their considerable 
holdings of sovereign bonds (Acharya and Steffen, 2015). Other banks that are not considered 
SIFIs are labelled ‘normal banks’. Although SIFI-to-sovereign and NB-to-sovereign rating 
transmission effects exist simultaneously, we try to separate them from each other in the 
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regression models. Hence, we construct four independent variables for SIFIs and NBs, 
respectively. The new variables apply to the upgrade and downgrade regression models in the 
following way:  
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The eight new independent variables in the Eq. (3) and Eq. (4) are defined as follows:  
, ,
_1 ( _1 )
i c i c
SIFIUPNO SIFIDNNO is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if there is 
one SIFI rating upgrade (downgrade) by CRA c in country i up to three months prior to month 
t; 0 otherwise.  
, ,
_ 2 ( _ 2 )
i c i c
SIFIUPNO SIFIDNNO  is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if there 
are two or more SIFI rating upgrades (downgrades) by CRA c in country i up to three months 
prior to month t; 0 otherwise.  
, ,
_1 ( _1 )
i c i c
NBUPNO NBDNNO  is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if there is 
one NB rating upgrade (downgrade) by CRA c in country i up to three months prior to month 
t; 0 otherwise.  
, ,
_ 2 ( _ 2 )
i c i c
NBUPNO NBDNNO  is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if there 
are two or more NB rating upgrades (downgrades) by CRA c in country i up to three months 
prior to month t; 0 otherwise.  
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Among the 1088 European banks rated by at least one of the three CRAs (see Table 2, 
Panel A), there are only 94 banks identified as SIFIs. Despite of the small sample size of 
SIFIs, we expect that the SIFI-to-sovereign rating contagion is more evident than the NB-to-
sovereign transmission within the subsample of negative rating signals. Since SIFIs represent 
a majority of European banking industry with respect to total assets and are therefore 
systemically important (Alsakka et al., 2014), multiple downgrades issued to a country’s 
SIFIs within a short period could induce stronger contagion to the sovereign sector if these 
rating events were treated as a strong indicator of systemic risk which arises from the 
country’s banking sector. Nevertheless, when shifting focus to the subsample of positive 
rating signals, we expect that the empirical evidence on positive SIFI-to-sovereign or NB-to-
sovereign rating spillovers becomes less significant among the countries in which bank rating 
upgrades are rare due to the breakout of European debt crisis. 
As second part of our robustness test, we modify our original rating datasets (as shown 
in Table 1) by deleting the entries without rating actions and generating a new monthly 
sample structure of sovereign and bank ratings. Then the sovereign rating actions (including 
rating changes, watch and outlook placements) are re-linked with bank rating signals 
(including rating changes and watch placements) by applying the 3-month linkage rule. As a 
result, bank ratings issued later than three months prior to the respective sovereign rating 
change are omitted. Consistent with the test methodology employed by Williams et al. (2013), 
we then run a pooled regression with new model specifications (Eq. (5) and Eq. (6)) as 
follows:  





2 , , , ,
1, ,
_1 _ 2 _1
              _ 2 *
              + ;    (0,1)                   
* * *
* * *






















+ + + +





, , 1 , 2 , 3 ,
4 , , 1




_1 _ 2 _1
              _ 2 *
              + ;    (0,1)                   
* * *
* * *
*  ~ 
i c t
i c t
i c t i c t
i c i c i c













+ + + +
+                                                       (6)




, ,i c t
SUP and 
*
, ,i c t
SDN are unobserved latent variables linked to the observed ordinal 










0 (i.e. no sovereign rating change)  if  SUP   
1 (i.e. sovereign upgrade of 1 notch)  if    
2 (i.e. sovereign upgrade of 2 or more notches)  if  
i c t


























0 (i.e. no sovereign rating change)  if  S   
1 (i.e. sovereign downgrade of 1 notch)  if    
2 (i.e. sovereign downgrade of 2 or more notches)  if  
i c t






















where µm are the thresholds to be determined using maximum likelihood estimation 
(MLE), along with parameters πn and n subject to the constraint µ1 < µ2.  
Compared with the previous two estimation models, there are two main differences. First, 
SUPi,c,t or SDN i,c,t takes the value of 0 only if a sovereign is either put on watch list, or on 
outlook list, such that no actual rating change has occurred. Second, we do not use the country 
and year dummies to control for fixed effects due to the new data structure in pooled 
regression estimation. Instead, we employ two dummy variables (GIIPS and Crisis) to control 
for country-specific and time-related differences, respectively.  
4. Empirical results 
Panel A of Table 4 shows regression results based on Eq. (1) and Eq. (2) for pooled rating 
data issued by all the three CRAs for all European countries over the whole sample period. 
For the upgrade model with SUP as the dependent variable, the positive coefficient of the 
variable BANKUPNO_2 indicates that multiple bank rating upgrades have a positive impact 
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on the corresponding sovereign rating action. The negative and significant coefficient of 
SovRat indicates that the higher the initial sovereign rating level, the weaker the positive 
bank-to-sovereign spillover effect. The marginal effects (MEs) show that if the total number 
of upgraded banks up to three months prior to the sovereign rating action is 2 or more, the 
probability of a single-notch (multiple-notch) sovereign upgrade is increased by 0.94% 
(0.32%).  
(Insert Table 4) 
In case of the downgrade model with SDN as the dependent variable, we observe a 
positive and significant coefficient of BANKDNNO_2, which provides evidence on the 
negative rating transmission channel. Since the coefficient of SovRat is negative and 
significant, this result is consistent with that in the positive transmission channel and confirms 
that sovereigns with a lower initial rating are more likely to be affected by bank rating 
downgrades. The marginal effects (MEs) show that if there are 2 or more bank downgrades up 
to three months prior to the sovereign rating action, the sovereign is 1.94% (1.54%) more 
likely to receive a single-notch (multiple-notch) rating downgrade. Furthermore, since the 
average absolute ME of BANKDNNO_2 (2.32%) in the downgrade model is higher than that 
of BANKUPNO_2 (0.84%) in the upgrade model, the negative bank-to-sovereign rating 
spillover effect appears to be stronger than the positive spillover effect among the European 
countries.  
The pooled rating sample is further broken down into GIIPS versus non-GIIPS 
subsamples. Panel B of Table 4 does not show any evidence on positive bank-to-sovereign 
rating transmission among the GIIPS, but confirms the negative rating spillover effect, since 
the coefficient of BANKDNNO_2 is positive and significant at the 1% level in the downgrade 
model. Especially, the MEs illustrate that a GIIPS country is 2.56% (3.60%) more likely to 
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receive a single-notch (multiple-notch) sovereign downgrade following multiple bank 
downgrades within a 3-month period. Moreover, Panel C of Table 4 illustrate that both 
positive and negative rating transmission channels seem to exist in the non-GIIPS subsample: 
the coefficient of the variable BANKUPNO_2 in the upgrade model and the coefficient of 
BANKDNNO_2 in the downgrade model are both positive and significant at the 1% level. 
Furthermore, the average MEs in the downgrade model illustrate that the sovereign rating 
downgrades among the non-GIIPS countries are affected by the macroeconomic factors 
current acc bal. (0.13%) and fiscal balance (0.09%). 
Next, we compare the results in Panel B with those in Panel C for upgrade and 
downgrade models, respectively. The sovereign upgrade models show that positive rating 
spillover effects only exist in the non-GIIPS countries, while the test results confirm the 
existence of negative rating transmission effects in both GIIPS and non-GIIPS subsamples. 
This is because bailouts of systemically relevant banks in the GIIPS countries (which could be 
result in bank upgrades) do not alleviate the problem of sustainability of sovereign debts and 
CRAs are still conscious of further deterioration of public finance in these countries. In 
contrast, an upgrade of demotic bank could be an undistorted signal of better credit condition 
in countries without lots of financial supports from ECB. Moreover, through comparing the 
average absolute MEs induced by BANKDNNO_2 in the downgrade model for the GIIPS 
subsample (4.11%) with that for the non-GIIPS subsample (1.54%), we conclude that the 
GIIPS sovereign ratings are more sensitive to domestic banking sector’s downside credit risk 
than the ratings of the other European countries.   
(Insert Table 5) 
Table 5 summarizes regression results based on Eq. (1) and Eq. (2) for pooled rating 
data from the three CRAs for the pre-crisis period versus the crisis and post-crisis period. As 
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shown in Panel A, both positive and negative spillover effects do not exist in the pre-crisis 
period. On the contrary, there is empirical evidence on rating spillover effects during the crisis 
and post-crisis period. If there are 2 or more bank upgrades up to three months prior to the 
sovereign rating action, the probability of a single-notch (multiple-notch) sovereign upgrade 
is increased by 0.91% (0.48%). Similarly, the coefficient of BANKDNNO_2 is significant at 
the 1% level in the downgrade model. It shows that the sovereign is 2.34% (2.23%) more 
likely to receive a single-notch (multiple-notch) rating downgrade following multiple bank 
rating downgrades. Moreover, the regression results in Panel B show that the bank-to-
sovereign negative spillover effects are more evident than the positive spillover effects since 
the crisis outbreak in 2009: the average ME of 3.05% associated with BANKDNNO_2 in the 
downgrade model is much larger than that of 0.93% associated with BANKUPNO_2 in the 
upgrade model.  
(Insert Table 6) 
Breaking down the full sample by CRA, the estimation results in Table 6 further provide 
evidence on agency-related differences in terms of both the existence of positive spillover 
effects and the degree of negative spillover effects. While the estimates for the Fitch 
subsample provide empirical support in favour of a positive bank-to-sovereign rating spillover 
effect, there is no significant evidence in the S&P and Moody’s subsamples. Nevertheless, 
there is consistent evidence on the negative spillover effect among all three CRA subsamples, 
since the coefficient of BANKDNNO_2 is positive and significant at the 1% level in all three 
downgrade models. Moreover, the average marginal effect associated with multiple bank 
downgrades issued by Fitch (3.09%) is economically larger than the MEs by S&P (2.92%) 
and Moody’s (1.81%). Thus, it seems that Fitch is more likely to downgrade a European 
country after releasing multiple domestic bank downgrades than S&P and Moody’s.  
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5. Robustness check 
We conduct a series of robustness tests to minimize the risk that our results are affected by 
potential endogeneity or methodology selection issue. First, Table 7 shows regression results 
on the basis of the long-term domestic currency sovereign and bank ratings3. Our baseline 
results remain unaffected. With respect to the full sample, the positive coefficient of the 
variable BANKUPNO_2 (BANKUPNO_2) confirms the above finding of positive (negative) 
bank-to-sovereign rating spillover effect. Similarly, the results for GIIPS and non-GIIPS 
countries are consistent with those based on the analysis with foreign currency ratings (as 
shown in Table 3): in the GIIPS subsample, there is only evidence on the negative rating 
spillover effect; and in the non-GIIPS subsample, both positive and negative rating 
transmission effects prevail. 
(Insert Table 7) 
Second, in order to investigate the SIFI-to-sovereign and NB-to-sovereign rating 
spillover effects separately, we set up four independent variables for SIFIs and NBs, 
respectively. For this end, based on Eq. (3) for the sovereign upgrade model and Eq. (4) for 
the sovereign downgrade model, the results in Panel A of Table 8 for the full sample among 
28 EU countries show that both multiple SIFI and NB rating changes spill over to sovereign 
ratings. While the average marginal effect associated with multiple SIFI upgrades (0.87%) is 
comparable with that associated with multiple NB upgrades (0.85%), the outcomes are 
different with respect to the negative transmission: If there are 2 or more SIFI downgrades up 
to three months prior to the sovereign rating action, the probability of a single-notch 
(multiple-notch) sovereign downgrade is increased by 1.82% (1.47%). These sovereign 
                                                 
3 Due to the space limit we only show the re-production of Table 3 with long-term domestic currency ratings 
using Eq. (1) and Eq. (2). The estimation results for pre-crisis versus crisis and post-crisis period and also GIIPS 
versus non-GIIPS subsample with domestic currency ratings do not show significant differences compared with 
Table 5 and Table 6, respectively. These additional robustness checks can be provided upon request.   
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downgrade probabilities led by SIFI downgrades are as twice much as those led by NB 
downgrades. This phenomenon provides evidence on our hypothesis that the negative bank-
to-sovereign spillover effect is mainly driven by the multiple downgrades issued to SIFIs.  
(Insert Table 8) 
The full sample is then broken down into GIIPS (Panel B) versus non-GIIPS 
subsamples (Panel C). Consistent with prior results shown in Table 4 and Table 7, the 
regression outcomes again confirm that the positive bank-to-sovereign spillover effects only 
exist among the non-GIIPS countries. Moreover, since both SIFIUPNO_2 and NBUPNO_2 
are significant at the 1% level and the average MEs associated with them are comparable, we 
cannot tell if the positive rating transmission is primarily induced by SIFIs or NBs in the non-
GIIPS subsample. By contrast to the analysis of positive spillovers, the regression results 
from the GIIPS subsample illustrate significant SIFI-to-sovereign and NB-to-sovereign rating 
contagion effects, while the former (average ME = 3.71%) are much larger than the latter 
(average ME = 1.83%) from an economic perspective. Besides, among the non-GIIPS 
countries, since SIFIDNNO_2 is significant at the 5% level and the coefficients of 
SIFIDNNO_1, NBDNNO_1 and NBDNNO_2 are insignificant, it seems that the rating 
contagion effects are only led by multiple SIFI downgrades. In sum, we conclude that the 
negative bank-to-sovereign spillover effects are mainly driven by multiple rating downgrades 
issued to SIFIs, and single bank downgrades do not have an impact on the respective 
sovereign rating.  
Third, to ensure that the choice of estimation methodology does not have a significant 
impact on our key results, we corroborate bank-to-sovereign rating spillover effects based on 
the pooled regression model specifications (Eq. (5) and Eq. (6)) employed by Williams et al. 
(2013). Again, our previous results are robust to this variation. For the full sample of 
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European countries, as shown in Panel A of Table 9, the positive coefficient of the variable 
BANKUPNO_2 (BANKDNNO_2) in the upgrade model (downgrade model) indicates that 
multiple bank rating upgrades (downgrades) have a significant impact on the corresponding 
sovereign rating action. Moreover, the coefficient of SovRat is negative and significant in both 
up- and downgrade regressions. This outcome again confirms that a country with a higher 
initial sovereign rating level is less exposed to the bank-to-sovereign spillover effect.  
(Insert Table 9) 
When comparing the MEs calculated for the pooled regression with those from our 
baseline results in Table 4, we observe that the former are much larger than the latter. The 
downgrade model for all EU countries may serve as an example: If there are two or more 
bank downgrades up to three months prior to the sovereign rating action of a European 
country, the sovereign is 11.43% (18.63%) more likely to receive a single-notch (multiple-
notch) rating downgrade.  
 (Insert Table 10) 
Fourth, Table 10 further describes additional estimation results for the sovereign rating 
samples generated with the 2-month and the 1-month linkage rule, respectively. In this part of 
the analysis, we use the baseline regression models (Eq. (1) and Eq. (2)) for this purpose. 
Typing in with Williams et al. (2013) and Alsakka et al. (2014), we originally apply a 3-
month linkage rule to the sovereign rating dataset by generating a linkage between sovereign 
and bank ratings issued by the same CRA. However, it is necessary to test whether a change 
in the length of linkage window leads to biased results. Since a long linkage window could 
lead to a contaminated rating sample, we focus on the alternative 2-month and 1-month rules.  
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The test results for the shorter windows show that there is still evidence on bank-to-
sovereign rating spillover effects in the full rating sample including all European countries. 
Interestingly, the shorter the linkage window is, the more severe the European sovereigns are 
exposed to systemic credit risks of domestic banking industry: the average ME of 
BANKDNNO_2 based on the 1-month rule is 4.81%, which is larger than that on the basis of 
the 2-month rule. In an analogue way, the average ME of BANKDNNO_2 based on the 2-
month rule of 3.15% is larger than 2.32% by applying the 3-month rule (as shown in Panel A 
of Table 4). As a consequence, our main results regarding the existence of bank-to-sovereign 
rating spillover effects are robust to variations in the linkage window. 
6. Conclusions 
Being providers of a widely used measure of credit risk that can easily be benchmarked 
against market-implied measures derived from bond yields or CDS prices, rating agencies 
face the challenge of reacting promptly as well as adequately to the arrival of new relevant 
information concerning debtors’ creditworthiness (Alsakka et al., 2014). In this context, the 
recent European debt crisis has put CRAs under scrutiny. By comparing the actions of the 
three major CRAs (S&P, Moody’s, Fitch) during the pre-crisis period (Jan 2002 - Dec 2008) 
and the crisis and post-crisis period (Jan 2009 - Dec 2016), we provide empirical evidence on 
rating spillover effects from the banking industry to the sovereign sector within the European 
Union. 
The first research question of our paper aims at investigating whether the bank-to-
sovereign rating transmission channel exists. We find that the crisis and post-crisis period is 
characterized by a significant increase of both bank and sovereign rating actions than the pre-
crisis period. When linking sovereign rating signals following respective domestic bank rating 
actions by up to three months, there are more sovereign downgrades than sovereign upgrades. 
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Moreover, the ordered probit regression analysis exhibits that both multiple bank rating 
upgrades and downgrades within a three-month period have a significant impact on the 
following sovereign rating changes in the same direction, and the negative rating spillover 
effect is more pronounced than the positive one, especially among the GIIPS countries.  
Our second research question relates to an association of the outbreak of the European 
sovereign debt crisis with a material change in the intensity of rating spillover effects, which 
suggests a change in CRAs’ rating behaviour. In the upgrade regression model, the results 
indicate that sovereign ratings are less sensitive to multiple bank upgrades during the crisis 
and post-crisis period. By contrast, the regression results for rating downgrades show that 
bank-to-sovereign negative spillover effects are more evident during 2009-2016. Therefore, 
we show that the severity of rating transmission effect is time-dependent despite of its 
existence in both sample periods.  
The final research question addresses potential differences in the level of bank-to-
sovereign spillover effects among the three leading credit rating agencies. Although negative 
rating spillover effects occur consistently for each of the three CRAs, sovereign ratings are 
more sensitive to multiple bank rating downgrades in the Fitch subsample than in the S&P 
and Moody’s subsamples. Moreover, positive spillovers occur only in the Fitch subsample. 
These results suggest a more evident bank-to-sovereign transmission channel for ratings 
issued by Fitch than by the other two CRAs.  Our results are robust to the changes in model 
specifications with respect to the currency type of ratings, the structure of regression models, 
and the approach used to link bank and sovereign ratings.  
Our results demonstrate important policy implications. Our results lend support to the 
notion that potential pro-cyclical chain reactions in the rating processes might endanger 
financial system stability: As a signal of deterioration in a country’s banking sector’s overall 
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creditworthiness, the multiple bank rating downgrades may raise the expectation of fiscal 
rescue actions or large bailouts, which can be associated with subsequent sovereign rating 
downgrades, especially when bailouts require substantial increases in public debt levels. The 
sovereign downgrades tend to lower the rating ceiling for the country’s domestic banks and in 
turn put further downgrade pressure on the banking sector.  Therefore, closely monitoring the 
bank-to-sovereign rating transmission channel should be of particular importance to financial 
market supervisors to allow for an early intervention if such a negative rating feedback loop is 
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Table 1: Descriptive characteristics for the pooled sovereign and bank rating data 
sample 
Panel A: Distribution of sovereign and bank rating changes 
Country Sovereign upgrades Sovereign downgrades Bank upgrades Bank downgrades 
Austria 0 2 16 68 
Belgium 2 4 34 61 
Bulgaria 14 5 29 31 
Croatia 1 7 7 13 
Cyprus 14 23 8 32 
Czech Republic 4 0 32 12 
Denmark 1 0 8 26 
Estonia 7 3 0 0 
Finland 1 3 7 10 
France 0 6 88 295 
Germany 0 0 677 237 
Greece 14 28 37 123 
Hungary 5 14 16 39 
Ireland 9 15 52 154 
Italy 2 13 115 348 
Latvia 15 12 2 6 
Lithuania 14 8 4 6 
Luxembourg 0 0 27 79 
Malta 4 5 1 4 
Netherlands 1 1 29 108 
Poland 3 1 25 28 
Portugal 4 15 15 89 
Romania 16 2 40 19 
Slovak Republic 14 2 26 10 
Slovenia 11 12 21 39 
Spain 7 15 91 358 
Sweden 4 0 40 33 
United Kingdom 0 4 137 412 
Total 167 200 1584 2640 
Panel B: Macroeconomic explanatory variables     
GPD per capita GDP per capita for the previous year (Thousands of US$) 
GDP growth Average annual real GDP growth for the previous three years (%) 
Inflation Average annual consumer price inflation growth for the previous three years (%) 
Current acc bal. 
Average annual current account balance relative to GDP for the previous three 
years (%) 
Fiscal balance 
Average annual central government deficit or surplus relative to GDP for the 
previous three years (%) 
External debt Total external debt relative to exports for the previous year (%) 
Notes: The table presents summary statistics for the pooled bank and sovereign credit rating data sample, 
which covers rating signals issued by the three leading CRAs for 1088 European banks and 28 EU countries, 
respectively. Panel A shows the distribution of long-term foreign currency rating changes (up- and 
downgrades) by country for both sovereigns and banks within the whole sample period (Jan 2002 - Dec 2016). 
Panel B presents macroeconomic explanatory variables that are used in later sensitivity tests. The 




Table 2: Breakdown of the sovereign and bank rating data sample by rating agency 
     S&P   Moody's   Fitch   Total   
Countries    28   28   26   28   
Rated 
banks    439   343   690   1088   
                 
Panel A: Pre-crisis period (Jan 2002 - Dec 2008)                      
Sovereigns Upgrades  32  1.4% 24  1.0% 39  1.7% 95  1.3% 
  Downgrades 13  0.6% 3  0.1% 12  0.5% 28  0.4% 
  Positive watch 0  0.0% 10  0.4% 1  0.0% 11  0.2% 
  Negative watch 1  0.0% 1  0.0% 2  0.1% 4  0.1% 
  Positive outlook 14  0.6% 17  0.7% 31  1.3% 62  0.9% 
 Negative outlook 12  0.5% 5  0.2% 17  0.7% 34  0.5% 
  No rating signal 2280  96.9% 2292  97.4% 2250  95.7% 6822  96.7% 
 Observations 2352   2352   2352   7056   
Banks Upgrades 285  2.2% 219  2.2% 207  1.5% 711  2.0% 
 Downgrades 157  1.2% 95  1.0% 139  1.0% 391  1.1% 
 Positive watch 31  0.2% 50  0.5% 22  0.2% 103  0.3% 
 Negative watch 60  0.5% 68  0.7% 18  0.1% 146  0.4% 
  No rating signal 12,547  95.9% 9,489  95.6% 13,048  97.1% 35,084  96.3% 
  Observations 13,080   9,921   13,434   36,435    
Panel B: Crisis and post-crisis period (Jan 2009 - Dec 2016)                   
Sovereigns Upgrades  35  1.3% 18  0.7% 19  0.7% 72  0.9% 
  Downgrades 67  2.5% 53  2.0% 52  1.9% 172  2.1% 
  Positive watch 0  0.0% 1  0.0% 1  0.0% 2  0.0% 
  Negative watch 27  1.0% 18  0.7% 14  0.5% 59  0.7% 
  Positive outlook 8  0.3% 7  0.3% 18  0.7% 33  0.4% 
 Negative outlook 14  0.5% 21  0.8% 44  1.6% 79  1.0% 
  No rating signal 2537  94.4% 2570  95.6% 2540  94.5% 7647  94.8% 
 Observations 2688   2688   2688   8064   
Banks Upgrades 135  1.0% 117  0.9% 621  4.7% 873  2.2% 
 Downgrades 811  6.1% 629  4.9% 809  6.1% 2249  5.7% 
 Positive watch 35  0.3% 49  0.4% 39  0.3% 123  0.3% 
 Negative watch 197  1.5% 255  2.0% 210  1.6% 662  1.7% 
  No rating signal 12,072  91.1% 11,697  91.8% 11,628  87.4% 35,397  90.1% 
  Observations 13,250   12,747   13,307   39,304   
Notes: The table presents summary statistics for the credit rating data sample, which covers 1088 banks from 28 
European countries. Panel A shows the distribution of end-of-month long-term foreign currency ratings (for both 
sovereigns and banks) as well as watch list and outlook signals (only for sovereigns) for the pre-crisis period 
(Jan 2002 - Dec 2008). Panel B illustrates the same sample statistics as in Panel A but for the crisis and post-
crisis period (Jan 2009 - Dec 2016). Panel C presents macroeconomic explanatory variables that are used in later 






Table 3: Descriptive characteristics for sovereign and bank rating actions by applying the 
3-month linkage rule within the GIIPS vs. the non-GIIPS countries 
    S&P     Moody's     Fitch     Total     
Panel A: GIIPS countries         
Sovereigns Upgrade by 1-notch 9  1.7% 2  0.4% 3  0.6% 14  0.9% 
 Upgrade by > 1-notch 1  0.2% 2  0.4% 3  0.6% 6  0.4% 
 Downgrade by 1-notch 18  3.4% 10  2.1% 13  2.6% 41  2.7% 
 Downgrade by > 1-notch 14  2.6% 14  3.0% 15  3.1% 43  2.9% 
 No rating change 491  92.1% 440  94.0% 457  93.1% 1388  93.0% 
 Observations 533   468   491   1492   
Banks Single upgrade 126  20.3% 86  16.9% 112  19.5% 324  19.0% 
 Multiple upgrades 106  17.1% 77  15.1% 64  11.1% 247  14.5% 
 Single downgrade 74  11.9% 75  14.7% 136  23.7% 285  16.7% 
 Multiple downgrades 230  37.0% 183  35.9% 213  37.0% 626  36.7% 
 No rating change 85  13.7% 89  17.5% 50  8.7% 224  13.1% 
 Observations 621   510   575   1706   
Panel B: Non-GIIPS countries             
Sovereigns Upgrade by 1-notch 12  1.0% 10  0.7% 19  1.8% 41  1.1% 
 Upgrade by > 1-notch 1  0.1% 5  0.3% 1  0.1% 7  0.2% 
 Downgrade by 1-notch 17  1.3% 15  1.0% 20  1.9% 52  1.4% 
 Downgrade by > 1-notch 1  0.1% 10  0.7% 4  0.4% 15  0.4% 
 No rating change 1230  97.5% 1485  97.4% 995  95.8% 3710  97.0% 
 Observations 1261   1525   1039   3825   
Banks Single upgrade 344  23.4% 281  17.3% 280  24.2% 905  21.3% 
 Multiple upgrades 212  14.4% 161  9.9% 185  16.0% 558  13.1% 
 Single downgrade 360  24.5% 408  25.2% 296  25.5% 1064  25.0% 
 Multiple downgrades 354  24.1% 376  23.2% 265  22.9% 995  23.4% 
 No rating change 199  13.5% 396  24.4% 133  11.5% 728  17.1% 
  Observations 1469     1622     1159     4250     
Notes: The table presents summary statistics for foreign-currency sovereign and bank rating actions by applying the 3-month 
linkage rule within the GIIPS (Panel A) or the non-GIIPS countries (Panel B). The 3-month linkage rule implies that a 
sovereign rating signal is linked with bank rating actions within the same country up to 3 months prior to its issue date. The 
GIIPS countries include Greece, Italy, Ireland, Portugal and Spain, while the non-GIIPS countries contain the rest of 23 
member countries of the EU. Sovereign rating upgrades (downgrades) are classified as single- or multiple-notch upgrades 
(downgrades). Bank rating upgrades (downgrades), which are issued within a 3-month period before the sovereign rating 
signal, are categorized as single and multiple upgrades (downgrades), respectively. No bank rating change means that at least 
one bank linked with sovereign rating is either put on the watch list or taken off watch status. 
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Table 4: Ordered probit estimation results with Eq. (1) and Eq. (2) for the whole sample and two sub-samples split into GIIPS and non-GIIPS 
  SUP   SDN 
 Coef.   t-value Marginal Effects   Coef.   t-value Marginal Effects 
        Avr |Chg|   0   1   2 ≤         Avr |Chg|   0   1   2 ≤ 
Panel A - All countries                      
BANKUPNO_1 0.15   0.81         -0.20  -1.40        
BANKUPNO_2 0.50   2.64*** 0.84%  -1.26%  0.94%  0.32%  -0.46  -2.18** 1.55%  2.32%  -1.29%  -1.03% 
BANKDNNO_1 0.01   0.04         0.22   1.50        
BANKDNNO_2 0.07   0.34         0.68   5.06*** 2.32%  -3.48%  1.94%  1.54% 
SovRat -0.07  -2.04** 0.11%  0.16%  -0.12%  -0.04%  -0.07  -3.74*** 0.22%  0.33%  -0.19%  -0.14% 
GPD per capita -0.01  -1.10         0.00  -0.50        
GDP growth -0.02  -0.54         -0.01  -0.27        
Inflation 0.01   0.67         -0.01  -0.36        
Current acc bal. 0.07   1.98** 0.11%  -0.17%  0.13%  0.04%  -0.06  -2.26** 0.19%  0.29%  -0.16%  -0.13% 
Fiscal balance 0.03   2.34** 0.05%  -0.08%  0.06%  0.02%  -0.01  -1.03        
External debt 0.00  -0.28         0.00   0.10        
D_Moody -0.20  -1.44         0.00  -1.01        
D_Fitch -0.08  -0.54         -0.08  #REF!        
Co & Y dummies Yes           Yes          
 Pseudo R2 26.75%  # Obs. 5166  Pseudo R2 23.54%  # Obs. 5249 
Panel B - GIIPS                                   
BANKUPNO_1 0.21   0.82         -0.14  -0.71        
BANKUPNO_2 0.42   1.70*         -0.22  -0.90        
BANKDNNO_1 0.45   1.62         -0.11  -0.40        
BANKDNNO_2 0.36   1.43         0.67   3.62*** 4.11%  -6.16%  2.56%  3.60% 
SovRat -0.02  -0.23         -0.07  -2.22** 0.45%  0.68%  -0.28%  -0.40% 
GPD per capita 0.00  -0.55         -0.01  -0.81        
GDP growth -0.09  -1.09         -0.02  -0.41        
Inflation 0.04   0.35         0.21   2.45** 1.30%  -1.95%  0.81%  1.14% 
Current acc bal. 0.11   1.80*         -0.06  -1.76*        
Fiscal balance 0.03   1.28         -0.04  -1.75*        
External debt 0.00   0.29         0.00  -0.15        
D_Moody -0.41  -1.42         -0.10  -0.68        
D_Fitch 0.03   0.14         -0.06  -0.39        
Co & Y dummies Yes                     Yes                   
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  Pseudo R2 24.31%   # Obs.   1408   Pseudo R2 19.52%   # Obs.   1472 
Panel C - Non-GIIPS                                   
BANKUPNO_1 0.21   0.85         -0.44  -2.00** 0.96%  1.44%  -1.05%  -0.39% 
BANKUPNO_2 0.69   2.59*** 1.07%  -1.60%  1.27%  0.33%  -3.72  -21.52*** 8.07%  12.10%  -8.81%  -3.29% 
BANKDNNO_1 -0.17  -0.63         0.39   1.88*        
BANKDNNO_2 -3.45  -20.79*** 5.33%  7.99%  -6.34%  -1.65%  0.71   3.44*** 1.54%  -2.31%  1.68%  0.63% 
SovRat 0.10   1.41         -0.11  -3.37*** 0.25%  0.37%  -0.27%  -0.10% 
GPD per capita 0.00  -0.08         0.01   1.08        
GDP growth -0.01  -0.14         -0.02  -0.84        
Inflation 0.02   1.25         -0.11  -1.75*        
Current acc bal. 0.10   2.09** 0.16%  -0.24%  0.19%  0.05%  -0.06  -2.13** 0.13%  0.20%  -0.15%  -0.05% 
Fiscal balance 0.03   1.06         0.04  2.86*** 0.09%  -0.13%  0.10%  0.03% 
External debt -0.01  -0.80         0.00  -0.24        
D_Moody -0.11  -0.55         -0.12  -0.77        
D_Fitch -0.12  -0.65         -0.12  -0.72        
Co & Y dummies Yes           Yes          
  Pseudo R2 32.42%   # Obs.   3758   Pseudo R2 27.59%   # Obs.   3777 
Notes: The table reports the results of the ordered probit estimations (Eq. (1) and Eq. (2)) with robust standard errors using pooled rating data from S&P, Moody’s, and Fitch. Panel A shows the 
results for all European countries. Panel B shows the results for the sub-sample of the GIIPS countries (Greece, Italy, Ireland, Portugal and Spain), while Panel C shows the results for the sub-sample 
of the non-GIIPS countries. The dependent variable is SUP (SDN), which equals either 0, or 1, or 2 if the sovereign rating of a European country i is upgraded (downgraded) by 0, 1, or 2 or more 
notches in month t, respectively. BANKUPNO_1 (BANKUPNO_2) is a dummy variable that is set to 1 if the number of a European country’s bank rating upgrades up to 3 months prior to month t is 
equal to one (more than one), and 0 otherwise. BANKDNNO_1 (BANKDNNO_2) is a dummy variable that is set to 1 if the number of a European country’s bank rating downgrades up to 3 months 
prior to month t is equal to one (more than one), and 0 otherwise. SovRat is the numerical sovereign rating from the previous month based on the 20-point rating scale. The independent 
macroeconomic variables are GDP per capita, GDP growth, inflation rate, current account balance, fiscal balance and external debt (as defined in Table 1, Panel C). To control for differences across 
CRAs, D-Fitch (D-Moody) is set to 1 if Fitch (Moody's) assigns the respective ratings. Thus, S&P is used as the reference agency. Dummy variables of respective countries (Co) and years (Y) are 
also included. We further estimate and report the impact of each variable on the probability of a rating change (marginal effect), but only for variables with coefficients that are significant at least at 
the 5% level. The estimates of the two threshold parameters are significant at the 1% level in all cases and are not shown in the table. Asterisks indicate significance at the 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% 
(***) level, respectively. 
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Table 5: Ordered probit estimation results with Eq. (1) and Eq. (2) for the pre-crisis period and for the crisis and post-crisis period 
  SUP   SDN 
 Coef.   t-value Marginal Effects   Coef.   t-value Marginal Effects 
        Avr |Chg|   0   1   2 ≤         Avr |Chg|   0   1   2 ≤ 




        -0.16  -0.41        
BANKUPNO_2 0.37 
  1.83*         0.55   1.47        
BANKDNNO_1 -0.42 
 -1.73*         0.31   0.70        
BANKDNNO_2 -3.66  -16.96*** 9.52% 
 14.28%  -11.64%  -2.64%  0.80   1.60        
SovRat -0.09  -2.78*** 0.24% 
 0.36%  -0.29%  -0.07%  -0.68  -4.30*** 0.44%  0.66%  -0.59%  -0.07% 
GPD per capita -0.01  -0.86         -0.06  -2.25** 0.04%  0.06%  -0.05%  -0.01% 
GDP growth 0.14   3.53*** 0.37%  -0.56%  0.46%  0.10%  0.60   1.09        
Inflation 0.00   0.49         -0.01  -0.08        
Current acc bal. 0.02   0.75 
        -0.42  -2.76*** 0.27%  0.40%  -0.36%  -0.04% 
Fiscal balance 0.00   0.58 
        -0.03  -0.44        
External debt -0.01  -1.34         0.03   0.90        
D_Moody 0.02   0.32 
        0.63   1.30        
D_Fitch 0.12   0.67 
        0.33   0.91        
Co & Y dummies Yes           Yes          
 Pseudo R2 23.02%  # Obs. 2,087  Pseudo R2 55.35%  # Obs. 2057 
Panel B - Crisis and post-crisis period (Jan 2009 - Dec 2016)                        
BANKUPNO_1 0.22   1.01         -0.20  -1.22        
BANKUPNO_2 0.79   4.10*** 0.93%  -1.39%  0.91%  0.48%  -4.36  -29.53*** 20.92%  31.38%  -16.05%  -15.33% 
BANKDNNO_1 0.19   0.81         0.13   0.80        
BANKDNNO_2 0.18   0.77         0.63   4.35*** 3.05%  -4.57%  2.34%  2.23% 
SovRat -0.14  -4.88*** 0.16%  0.24%  -0.16%  -0.08%  -0.06  -2.84*** 0.27%  0.41%  -0.21%  -0.20% 
GPD per capita -0.01  -1.18         0.00   0.55        
GDP growth 0.08   1.24         -0.02  -0.89        
Inflation -0.08  -0.96         0.05   0.71        
Current acc bal. 0.06   2.18** 0.07%  -0.10%  0.07%  0.03%  -0.05  -1.36        
Fiscal balance 0.00   0.41         -0.02  -1.15        
External debt 0.00   0.53         0.00   0.66        
D_Moody -0.38  -1.66         -0.08  -0.68        
D_Fitch -0.03  -0.13         -0.10  -0.88        
Co & Y dummies Yes           Yes          




Notes: The table reports the results of the ordered probit estimations (Eq. (1) and Eq. (2)) with robust standard errors using pooled rating data from S&P, Moody’s, and Fitch. Panel A shows the 
results for the pre-crisis period, while Panel B shows the results for the crisis and post-crisis period. The dependent variable is SUP (SDN), which equals either 0, or 1, or 2 if the sovereign rating of 
a European country i is upgraded (downgraded) by 0, 1, or 2 or more notches in month t, respectively. BANKUPNO_1 (BANKUPNO_2) is a dummy variable that is set to 1 if the number of a 
European country’s bank rating upgrades up to 3 months prior to month t is equal to one (more than one), and 0 otherwise. BANKDNNO_1 (BANKDNNO_2) is a dummy variable that is set to 1 if 
the number of a European country’s bank rating downgrades up to 3 months prior to month t is equal to one (more than one), and 0 otherwise. SovRat is the numerical sovereign rating from the 
previous month based on the 20-point rating scale. The independent macroeconomic variables are GDP per capita, GDP growth, inflation rate, current account balance, fiscal balance and external 
debt (as defined in Table 1, Panel C). To control for differences across CRAs, D-Fitch (D-Moody) is set to 1 if Fitch (Moody's) assigns the respective ratings. Thus, S&P is used as the reference 
agency. Dummy variables of respective countries (Co) and years (Y) are also included. We further estimate and report the impact of each variable on the probability of a rating change (marginal 
effect), but only for variables with coefficients that are significant at least at the 5% level. The estimates of the two threshold parameters are significant at the 1% level in all cases, and are not shown 
in the table. Where no coefficients are reported, there were insufficient observations for the respective independent variable. 
Asterisks indicate significance at the 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% (***) level, respectively. 
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Table 6: Ordered probit estimation results with Eq. (1) and Eq. (2) for sub-samples split by rating agency 
  SUP   SDN 
 Coef.   t-value Marginal Effects   Coef.   t-value Marginal Effects 
        Avr |Chg|   0   1   2 ≤         Avr |Chg|   0   1   2 ≤ 
Panel A - S&P                      
BANKUPNO_1 0.37   1.39         -0.08  -0.37        
BANKUPNO_2 0.41   1.47         -0.36  -1.26        
BANKDNNO_1 -0.14  -0.46         0.38   1.24        
BANKDNNO_2 0.23   0.74         0.89  3.17*** 2.92%  -4.38%  2.82%  1.56% 
SovRat 0.01   0.16 
        -0.09  -2.17** 0.30%  0.45%  -0.29%  -0.16% 
GPD per capita -0.01  -0.80         -0.01  -0.62        
GDP growth 0.02   0.32         0.01   0.17        
Inflation -0.01  -0.04         -0.05  -1.13        
Current acc bal. 0.20   3.52*** 0.35%  -0.52%  0.45%  0.07%  -0.03  -0.73        
Fiscal balance 0.00   0.13         -0.02  -0.68        
External debt 0.01   0.70         0.01   0.93        
Co & Y dummies Yes           Yes          
 Pseudo R2 28.43%  # Obs. 1,744  Pseudo R2 25.71%  # Obs. 1771 
Panel B - Moody's                                   
BANKUPNO_1 0.20 
  0.57         0.07   0.26 
       
BANKUPNO_2 
0.32   0.89         -4.35  
-
8.64*** 
11.75%  17.62%  -7.65%  -9.97% 
BANKDNNO_1 -0.37 




        0.67   3.12*** 1.81% 
 -2.71%  1.18%  1.53% 
SovRat -0.02  -0.17 
        -0.01  -0.38        
GPD per capita -0.01  -1.28         0.00   0.61 
       
GDP growth 
0.01  
 0.15         -0.13  
-
2.60*** 
0.35%  0.53%  -0.23%  -0.30% 
Inflation 0.02   1.08         0.01   0.02        
Current acc bal. -0.02  -0.33         -0.27  
-
4.34*** 
0.72%  1.08%  -0.47%  -0.61% 
Fiscal balance 0.20   3.21*** -0.05%  -0.33%  0.18%  0.15%  0.02   1.13        
External debt 0.03   1.51 
        0.00   0.26        




  Pseudo R2 38.17%   # Obs.   1944   Pseudo R2 30.99%   # Obs.   1974 
Panel C - Fitch                                   
BANKUPNO_1 0.57   1.85*         -0.49  -1.78*        
BANKUPNO_2 1.54 




        0.23   0.93 
       
BANKDNNO_2 -0.03 
 -0.05         0.79   3.37*** 3.09%  -4.64%  2.63%  2.01% 
SovRat -0.11  
-2.15** 0.21%  0.32%  -0.25%  -0.07%  -0.10  
-
2.92*** 
0.39%  0.58%  -0.33%  -0.25% 
GPD per capita 0.00  -0.54         -0.01  -0.95        
GDP growth -0.10  -1.58  
       0.04   0.83 
       
Inflation -0.02  -1.06         0.01   0.67 
       
Current acc bal. 0.10   1.62         -0.04  -1.12        
Fiscal balance 0.01   0.43         -0.01  -0.65        
External debt -0.03  -1.56 
        0.00  -0.30        
Co & Y dummies Yes           Yes          
  Pseudo R2 35.57%   # Obs.   1478   Pseudo R2 23.29%   # Obs.   1504 
Notes: The three panels of this table report the results of the ordered probit estimations (Eq. (1) and Eq. (2)) with robust standard errors by using the sub-sample of rating data from S&P, Moody’s, 
and Fitch, respectively. The dependent variable is SUP (SDN), which equals either 0, or 1, or 2 if the sovereign rating of a European country i is upgraded (downgraded) by a rating agency by 0, 1, 
or 2 or more notches in month t, respectively. BANKUPNO_1 (BANKUPNO_2) is a dummy variable that is set to 1 if the number of a European country’s bank rating upgrades up to 3 months prior 
to month t is equal to one (more than one), and 0 otherwise. BANKDNNO_1 (BANKDNNO_2) is a dummy variable that is set to 1 if the number of a European country’s bank rating downgrades up 
to 3 months prior to month t is equal to one (more than one), and 0 otherwise. SovRat is the numerical sovereign rating from the previous month based on the 20-point rating scale. The independent 
macroeconomic variables are GDP per capita, GDP growth, inflation rate, current account balance, fiscal balance and external debt (as defined in Table 1, Panel C). To control for differences across 
CRAs, D-Fitch (D-Moody) is set to 1 if Fitch (Moody's) assigns the respective ratings. Thus, S&P is used as the reference agency. Dummy variables of respective countries (Co) and years (Y) are 
also included. We further estimate and report the impact of each variable on the probability of a rating change (marginal effect), but only for variables with coefficients that are significant at least at 
the 5% level. The estimates of the two threshold parameters are significant at the 1% level in all cases and are not shown in the table. Asterisks indicate significance at the 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% 
(***) level, respectively. 
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Table 7: Ordered probit estimation results with Eq. (1) and Eq. (2) for the sample of domestic currency sovereign and bank ratings 
  SUP   SDN 
 Coef.   t-value Marginal Effects   Coef.   t-value Marginal Effects 
        Avr |Chg|   0   1   2 ≤         Avr |Chg|   0   1   2 ≤ 
Panel A - All countries            
   
       
BANKUPNO_1 0.39   2.13** 0.53%  -0.79%  0.61%  0.18%  -0.21 
 -1.48        
BANKUPNO_2 0.73   3.71*** 0.97%  -1.46%  1.12%  0.34%  -0.27 
 -1.62        
BANKDNNO_1 0.17   0.76         0.31 
  2.21** 1.12%  -1.68%  0.96%  0.72% 
BANKDNNO_2 0.20   0.81         0.70 
  5.28*** 2.55%  -3.83%  2.18%  1.65% 
SovRat -0.12  -2.91*** 0.16% 
 0.24%  -0.18%  -0.06%  -0.07  -4.19*** 0.27%  0.40%  -0.23%  -0.17% 
GPD per capita -0.01  -2.20** 0.02%  0.03%  -0.02%  -0.01%  0.00 
 -0.41        
GDP growth 0.03   0.72         -0.02 
 -0.72        
Inflation 0.01   0.15         -0.03 
 -0.77        
Current acc bal. 0.07   2.27** 0.10%  -0.15%  0.12%  0.03%  -0.06 
 -2.47** 0.23%  0.34%  -0.20%  -0.14% 
Fiscal balance 0.02   1.67*         -0.01 
 -1.06        
External debt 0.00  -0.33         0.00 
  0.43        
D_Moody -0.26  -1.55         -0.10 
 -0.97        
D_Fitch -0.01  -0.05         -0.05 
 -0.52        
Co & Y dummies Yes           Yes 
  
       
 Pseudo R2 29.99%  # Obs. 4,971  Pseudo R2 22.28%  # Obs. 5077 
Panel B - GIIPS                                   
BANKUPNO_1 0.45 




        -0.29  -1.20        
BANKDNNO_1 0.16 




        0.74   3.87*** 4.60%  -6.90%  2.98%  3.92% 
SovRat -0.08  -1.24 
        -0.07  -2.09** 0.44%  0.66%  -0.29%  -0.37% 
GPD per capita -0.04  -1.80*         0.00  -0.85        
GDP growth -0.12  -1.78*         -0.03  -0.65        
Inflation 0.13   1.30         0.23   2.61*** 1.43%  -2.15%  0.93%  1.22% 
Current acc bal. 0.08   1.26         -0.04  -1.24        
Fiscal balance 0.01   0.46         -0.04  -1.87*        
External debt 0.00   0.19         0.00  -0.18        
D_Moody -0.56  -2.08** 0.81%  1.22%  -0.82%  -0.40%  -0.06  -0.42        
D_Fitch 0.01  -0.02         -0.04  -0.29        
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Co & Y dummies Yes           Yes          
  Pseudo R2 25.62%   # Obs.   1378   Pseudo R2 19.81%   # Obs.   1448 
Panel C - Non-GIIPS                                   
BANKUPNO_1 0.48 
  1.65*         -0.46  -2.15** 1.14%  1.71%  -1.24%  -0.47% 
BANKUPNO_2 1.02 
  3.03*** 1.25%  -1.88%  1.52%  0.36%  -0.29  -1.25        
BANKDNNO_1 0.24 
  0.86         0.48   2.48** 1.19%  -1.78%  1.29%  0.49% 
BANKDNNO_2 -3.47 
 -8.16*** 4.28%  6.42%  -5.19%  -1.23%  0.64   3.28*** 1.57%  -2.35%  1.70%  0.65% 
SovRat -0.11  -2.15** 0.13% 
 0.20%  -0.16%  -0.04%  -0.13  -3.93*** 0.33%  0.50%  -0.36%  -0.14% 
GPD per capita -0.01  -0.64         0.01   1.12        
GDP growth 0.09   1.62         -0.03  -1.20        
Inflation 0.00   0.25         -0.08  -1.47        
Current acc bal. 0.09   2.27** 0.11%  -0.16%  0.13%  0.03%  -0.07  -2.48** 0.17%  0.26%  -0.19%  -0.07% 
Fiscal balance 0.05   2.52** 0.07%  -0.10%  0.08%  0.02%  0.03   2.44*** 0.09%  -0.13%  0.09%  0.04% 
External debt 0.00  -0.35         0.00  -0.15        
D_Moody -0.09  -0.35         -0.15  -1.02        
D_Fitch 0.01   0.06         -0.04  -0.29        
Co & Y dummies Yes           Yes          
  Pseudo R2 35.49%   # Obs.   3593   Pseudo R2 25.32%   # Obs.   3629 
Notes: The table reports the results of the ordered probit estimations (Eq. (1) and Eq. (2)) with robust standard errors by using pooled long-term domestic currency rating data from S&P, Moody’s, 
and Fitch. Panel A shows the results for all European countries, whilst Panel B and Panel C show the results for the GIIPS countries and the non-GIIPS countries, respectively. The dependent 
variable is SUP (SDN), which equals either 0, or 1, or 2 if the sovereign rating of a European country i is upgraded (downgraded) by a rating agency by 0, 1, or 2 or more notches in month t, 
respectively. BANKUPNO_1 (BANKUPNO_2) is a dummy variable that is set to 1 if the number of a European country’s bank rating upgrades up to 3 months prior to month t is equal to one (more 
than one), and 0 otherwise. BANKDNNO_1 (BANKDNNO_2) is a dummy variable that is set to 1 if the number of a European country’s bank rating downgrades up to 3 months prior to month t is 
equal to one (more than one), and 0 otherwise. SovRat is the numerical sovereign rating from the previous month based on the 20-point rating scale. The independent macroeconomic variables are 
GDP per capita, GDP growth, inflation rate, current account balance, fiscal balance and external debt (as defined in Table 1, Panel C). To control for differences across CRAs, D-Fitch (D-Moody) is 
set to 1 if Fitch (Moody's) assigns the respective ratings. Thus, S&P is used as the reference agency. Dummy variables of respective countries (Co) and years (Y) are also included. We further 
estimate and report the impact of each variable on the probability of a rating change (marginal effect), but only for variables with coefficients that are significant at least at the 5% level. The 
estimates of the two threshold parameters are significant at the 1% level in all cases and are not shown in the table. Where no coefficients are reported, there were insufficient observations for the 




Table 8: Ordered probit estimation results with Eq. (3) and Eq. (4) in terms of separate treatment of SIFI and NB rating changes  
  SUP   SDN  
 Coef.   t-value Marginal Effects   Coef.   t-value Marginal Effects  
        
Avr 
|Chg|   0   1   2 ≤   
      
Avr 
|Chg|   0   1   2 ≤  
Panel A - All 
countries            
   
        
SIFIUPNO_1 0.27   1.84*         -0.61 
 -1.67*         
SIFIUPNO_2 0.55   2.48** 0.87%  -1.31%  1.02%  0.29%  0.09 
  0.26         
NBUPNO_1 0.23   1.63         -0.23 
 -1.51         
NBUPNO_2 0.54   3.11*** 0.85%  -1.28%  0.99%  0.29%  -0.56 
 -1.57         
SIFIDNNO_1 0.37   1.85* 
        0.01   0.10         
SIFIDNNO_2 0.55   1.96* 
        0.66   5.39*** 2.19%  -3.29%  1.82%  1.47%  
NBDNNO_1 -0.29  -1.58 
        0.22   1.89*         
NBDNNO_2 -3.91  
-
15.13*** 
6.21%  9.31%  -7.23%  -2.08%  0.30   2.29** 1.01%  -1.51%  0.84%  0.67% 
 
SovRat -0.13  -6.25*** 0.20% 
 0.30%  -0.23%  -0.07%  -0.06  -3.00*** 0.19%  0.29%  -0.16%  -0.13%  
GPD per capita -0.01  -1.34         0.00 
 -1.09        
 
GDP growth 0.11   2.94*** 0.17%  -0.25%  0.20%  0.05%  0.07 
  2.02** 0.25%  -0.37%  0.20%  0.17% 
 
Inflation 0.00   0.31         0.01 
  0.70        
 
Current acc bal. 0.04   2.13** 0.06%  -0.09%  0.07%  0.02%  -0.02 
 -0.80        
 
Fiscal balance 0.00   0.85         -0.02 
 -1.37        
 
External debt -0.01  -1.09         0.00 
  0.74         
D_Moody -0.27  -1.71*         -0.14 
 -1.25         
D_Fitch 0.00   0.02         -0.12 
 -1.13         
Co & Y dummies Yes           Yes 
  
        
 Pseudo R2 23.81%  # Obs. 5,054  Pseudo R2 26.24%  # Obs. 5146  
Panel B - GIIPS                                    
SIFIUPNO_1 
0.06   0.18         -3.65  
-
13.55*** 
21.05%  31.57%  -12.85%  -18.72% 
 
SIFIUPNO_2 0.25 
  0.88         0.17   0.43         
NBUPNO_1 0.39 
  1.58         -0.28  -1.37         
NBUPNO_2 0.29 
  0.77         -0.49  -1.33         
SIFIDNNO_1 0.42 
  1.70*         0.08   0.39         
SIFIDNNO_2 0.70 
  1.83*         0.64   3.89*** 3.71%  -5.56%  2.26%  3.30%  
NBDNNO_1 -0.17 







8.39%  12.59%  -7.92%  -4.67%  0.32   2.02** 1.83%  -2.75%  1.12%  1.63% 
 
SovRat -0.03  -0.26 
        -0.08  -2.07** 0.43%  0.65%  -0.26%  -0.39%  
GPD per capita 0.00  -0.00 
        0.00  -0.44         
GDP growth 0.04   0.34 
        0.02   0.27         
Inflation 0.03   0.14 
        0.26   2.18** 1.52%  -2.28%  0.93%  1.35%  
Current acc bal. -0.01  -0.18         0.01   0.26         
Fiscal balance -0.01  -0.72 
        -0.04  -0.93         
External debt 0.00  -0.27 
        0.00   0.32         
D_Moody -0.36  -1.23 
        -0.11  -0.72         
D_Fitch 0.09   0.34 
        -0.11  -0.71         
Co & Y dummies Yes           Yes           
  Pseudo R2 24.77%   # Obs.   1401   Pseudo R2 23.94%   # Obs.   1465  
Panel C - Non-GIIPS                                    
SIFIUPNO_1 0.47   1.75*        
 -0.41  -0.97         
SIFIUPNO_2 0.87   2.65*** 1.17%  -1.76%  1.51%  0.25% 
 -2.38  -5.65*** 4.91%  7.36%  -5.32%  -2.04%  
NBUPNO_1 0.21   1.17        
 -0.37  -1.51         
NBUPNO_2 0.67  
 3.24*** 
0.91%  -1.36%  1.16%  0.20% 
 -3.71  
-
17.56*** 
7.65%  11.47%  -8.29%  -3.18% 
 
SIFIDNNO_1 -0.07  -0.17 
        -0.05  -0.26         
SIFIDNNO_2 -3.46  -8.01*** 4.67% 
 7.00%  -5.98%  -1.02%  0.54   2.56** 1.11%  -1.67%  1.20%  0.47%  
NBDNNO_1 -0.39  -1.47 
        0.26   1.51         
NBDNNO_2 -3.77  
-
21.48*** 
5.09%  7.63%  -6.52%  -1.11%  0.26   1.33        
 
SovRat -0.14  -5.36*** 0.19% 
 0.29%  -0.25%  -0.04%  -0.15  -3.85*** 0.31%  0.47%  -0.34%  -0.13%  
GPD per capita -0.01  -1.24        
 0.00  -0.11 
       
 
GDP growth 0.18   3.62*** 0.25%  -0.37%  0.31%  0.06% 
 0.26   3.82*** 0.53% 
 -0.80%  0.58%  0.22%  
Inflation 0.00  -0.20        
 -0.06  -0.50 
       
 
Current acc bal. 0.06   3.01*** 0.09%  -0.13%  0.11%  0.02% 
 0.00   0.07         
Fiscal balance 0.02   1.44        
 0.08   3.21*** 0.16% 
 -0.24%  0.17%  0.07%  
External debt -0.02  -1.43        
 0.00  -0.36 
       
 
D_Moody -0.16  -0.78        
 -0.08  -0.45 
       
 
D_Fitch -0.06  -0.32        
 -0.11  -0.63 
       
 
Co & Y dummies Yes           Yes           
  Pseudo R2 31.44%   # Obs.   3653   Pseudo R2 32.63%   # Obs.   3681  
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The table reports the results of the ordered probit estimations (Eq. (3) and Eq. (4)) with robust standard errors by using pooled long-term foreign currency rating data from S&P, Moody’s, and 
Fitch. In this part of analysis, the bank rating signals issued to Systemically Important Financial Institutions (SIFIs) are treated separately compared to the rating signals issued to Normal Banks 
(NBs). Panel A shows the results for all European countries, whilst Panel B and Panel C show the results for the GIIPS countries and the non-GIIPS countries, respectively. The dependent 
variable is SUP (SDN), which equals either 0, or 1, or 2 if the sovereign rating of a European country i is upgraded (downgraded) by a rating agency by 0, 1, or 2 or more notches in month t, 
respectively. SIFIUPNO_1 (SIFIUPNO_2) is a dummy variable that is set to 1 if the number of a European country’s SIFI rating upgrades up to 3 months prior to month t is equal to one (more 
than one), and 0 otherwise. SIFIDNNO_1 (SIFIDNNO_2) is a dummy variable that is set to 1 if the number of a European country’s SIFI rating downgrades up to 3 months prior to month t is 
equal to one (more than one), and 0 otherwise. NBUPNO_1 (NBUPNO_2) is a dummy variable that is set to 1 if the number of a European country’s NB rating upgrades up to 3 months prior to 
month t is equal to one (more than one), and 0 otherwise. NBDNNO_1 (NBDNNO_2) is a dummy variable that is set to 1 if the number of a European country’s NB rating downgrades up to 3 
months prior to month t is equal to one (more than one), and 0 otherwise. SovRat is the numerical sovereign rating from the previous month based on the 20-point rating scale. The independent 
macroeconomic variables are GDP per capita, GDP growth, inflation rate, current account balance, fiscal balance and external debt (as defined in Table 1, Panel C). To control for differences 
across CRAs, D-Fitch (D-Moody) is set to 1 if Fitch (Moody's) assigns the respective ratings. Thus, S&P is used as the reference agency. Dummy variables of respective countries (Co) and years 
(Y) are also included. We further estimate and report the impact of each variable on the probability of a rating change (marginal effect), but only for variables with coefficients that are significant 
at least at the 5% level. The estimates of the two threshold parameters are significant at the 1% level in all cases, and are not shown in the table. Where no coefficients are reported, there were 




















Table 9: Ordered probit estimation results with Eq. (5) and Eq. (6) for the whole sample and two sub-samples with respect to the European debt crisis 
  SUP   SDN 
 Coef.   t-value Marginal Effects   Coef.   t-value Marginal Effects 
        Avr |Chg|   0   1   2 ≤         Avr |Chg|   0   1   2 ≤ 
Panel A - All countries                  
BANKUPNO_1 0.38   1.33         -0.02  -0.08        
BANKUPNO_2 1.21   3.98*** 14.71%  -22.06%  14.37%  7.69%  -0.70  -1.87*        
BANKDNNO_1 -0.18  -0.58         0.54   2.28** 9.84%  -14.76%  5.61%  9.15% 
BANKDNNO_2 -0.53  -1.75*         1.11   5.00*** 20.04%  -30.06%  11.43%  18.63% 
SovRat -0.20  -4.94*** 2.37% 
 3.55%  -2.31%  -1.24%  -0.08  -3.70*** 1.40%  2.10%  -0.80%  -1.30% 
GPD per capita -0.03  -3.17*** 0.32%  0.48%  -0.32%  -0.16%  -0.01  -1.90*        
GDP growth 0.07   1.32         -0.01  -0.42        
Inflation -0.01  -1.16         -0.09  -1.91*        
Current acc bal. 0.07   2.34** 0.91%  -1.36%  0.88%  0.48%  -0.07  -3.16*** 1.23%  1.84%  -0.70%  -1.14% 
Fiscal balance 0.02   1.33         0.00   0.22        
External debt 0.00   0.12         0.00  -0.08        
D_Moody -0.28  -1.09         -0.08  -0.46        
D_Fitch -0.65  -2.92*** 7.83%  11.75%  -7.65%  -4.10%  -0.56  -3.37*** 10.22%  15.33%  -5.83%  -9.50% 
GIIPS 0.50   1.87*         0.19   1.07        
Crisis -0.76  -2.80*** 9.18%  13.77%  -8.97%  -4.80%  -0.01  -0.03        
 Pseudo R2 33.34%  # Obs. 296  Pseudo R2 23.80%  # Obs. 383 
Panel B - Pre-crisis period (Jan 2002 - Dec 2008)                            
BANKUPNO_1 0.43   1.12         -0.47  -0.66        
BANKUPNO_2 1.23   2.99*** 22.75%  -34.13%  22.53%  11.60%  NA          
BANKDNNO_1 -0.46  -0.95         1.18   1.69*        
BANKDNNO_2 NA           3.02   3.03*** 20.67%  -31.00%  27.54%  3.46% 
SovRat -0.03  -0.44 
        -0.56  -3.00*** 3.81%  5.72%  -5.08%  -0.64% 
GPD per capita -0.03  -2.22** 0.55%  0.83%  -0.55%  -0.28%  -0.15  -2.66*** 1.06%  1.59%  -1.41%  -0.18% 
GDP growth 0.04   0.50         -0.36  -2.12** 2.49%  3.73%  -3.32%  -0.41% 
Inflation 0.01   0.68         -0.12  -1.06        
Current acc bal. -0.04  -0.7         -0.32  -2.70*** 2.22%  3.33%  -2.96%  -0.37% 
Fiscal balance 0.01   0.51         0.03   1.25        
External debt 0.00  -0.08         0.07   1.43        
D_Moody -0.26  -0.77         -0.06  -0.09        
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D_Fitch -0.60  -1.81* 




        0.93   1.09        
  Pseudo R2 24.22%   # Obs.   104   Pseudo R2 62.46%   # Obs.   76 
Panel C - Crisis and post-crisis period (Jan 2009 - Dec 2016)                        
BANKUPNO_1 0.84   1.82*         0.13   0.47        
BANKUPNO_2 2.10   5.03*** 14.01%  -21.02%  13.38%  7.64%  NA          
BANKDNNO_1 0.04   0.10         0.46   1.67*        
BANKDNNO_2 -0.37  -0.94         1.01   4.29*** 19.95%  -29.93%  9.43%  20.50% 
SovRat -0.34 
 -4.44*** 2.25%  3.38%  -2.15%  -1.23%  -0.07  -3.32*** 1.39%  2.08%  -0.66%  -1.42% 
GPD per capita -0.03  -2.93*** 0.22%  0.33%  -0.21%  -0.12%  -0.01  -1.26        
GDP growth 0.13 
  1.72*         -0.02  -0.48        
Inflation 0.31   2.45** 2.07%  -3.11%  1.98%  1.13%  -0.13  -1.91*        
Current acc bal. 0.20   3.74*** 1.31%  -1.96%  1.25%  0.71%  -0.07  -3.17*** 1.44%  2.16%  -0.68%  -1.48% 
Fiscal balance 0.00   0.15         0.00   0.02        
External debt -0.01  -0.33         0.00   0.03        
D_Moody -0.28  -0.64         0.03   0.13        
D_Fitch -0.38  -0.92         -0.56  -3.12*** 10.93%  16.40%  -5.17%  -11.23% 
GIIPS 1.75 
  3.32*** 11.53%  -17.45%  11.10%  6.03%  0.12   0.60        
  Pseudo R2 45.55%   # Obs.   192   Pseudo R2 19.83%   # Obs.   307 
Notes: The table reports the results of the ordered probit regressions (Eq. (3) and Eq. (4)) with robust standard errors by using pooled long-term foreign currency rating data from S&P, Moody’s, and 
Fitch. Panel A shows the results for all European countries. Panel B shows the results for the pre-crisis period, while Panel C shows the results for the crisis and post-crisis period. The dependent 
variable is SUP (SDN), which equals either 0, or 1, or 2 if the sovereign rating of a European country i is upgraded (downgraded) by a rating agency by 0, 1, or 2 or more notches in month t, 
respectively. BANKUPNO_1 (BANKUPNO_2) is a dummy variable that is set to 1 if the number of a European country’s bank rating upgrades up to 3 months prior to month t is equal to one (more 
than one), and 0 otherwise. BANKDNNO_1 (BANKDNNO_2) is a dummy variable that is set to 1 if the number of a European country’s bank rating downgrades up to 3 months prior to month t is 
equal to one (more than one), and 0 otherwise. SovRat is the numerical sovereign rating from the previous month based on the 20-point rating scale. The independent macroeconomic variables are 
GDP per capita, GDP growth, inflation rate, current account balance, fiscal balance and external debt (as defined in Table 1, Panel C). To control for differences across CRAs, D-Fitch (D-Moody) is 
set to 1 if Fitch (Moody's) assigns the respective ratings. Thus, S&P is used as the reference agency. GIIPS is a dummy variable equaling 1 if the sovereign rating signal originates from a GIIPS 
country; 0 otherwise. Crisis is a dummy variable equaling 1 if the sovereign rating signal falls into the crisis and post-crisis period from January 2009 to December 2016; 0 otherwise. We further 
estimate and report the impact of each variable on the probability of a rating change (marginal effect), but only for variables with coefficients that are significant at least at the 5% level. The 
estimates of the two threshold parameters are significant at the 1% level in all cases, and are not shown in the table. Where no coefficients are reported, there were insufficient observations for the 
respective independent variable. Asterisks indicate significance at the 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% (***) level, respectively. 
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Table 10: Ordered probit estimation results for the sovereign rating samples in application of 2-month and 1-month linkage rule 
  SUP   SDN 
 Coef.   t-value Marginal Effects   Coef.   t-value Marginal Effects 
        Avr |Chg|   0   1   2 ≤         Avr |Chg|   0   1   2 ≤ 
Panel A - Full sample in case of 2-month linkage                  
BANKUPNO_1 0.03   0.14         -0.32  -1.90* 
       
BANKUPNO_2 0.52   2.70*** 0.91%  -1.37%  0.99%  0.38%  -0.80  -2.21** 2.82%  4.23%  -2.32%  -1.91% 
BANKDNNO_1 0.05   0.27         0.42   2.72*** 1.49%  -2.23%  1.22%  1.01% 
BANKDNNO_2 -0.08  -0.34 
        0.89   6.12*** 3.15%  -4.73%  2.59%  2.14% 
SovRat -0.07  -2.07** 0.13% 
 0.19%  -0.14%  -0.05%  -0.08  -3.86*** 0.27%  0.40%  -0.22%  -0.18% 
GPD per capita -0.01  -1.33         0.00  -0.74        
GDP growth #REF!  -0.15         0.00   0.08 
       
Inflation 0.01   0.48         0.01   0.31        
Current acc bal. 0.07   2.01** 0.13%  -0.20%  0.14%  0.06%  -0.04  -1.42        
Fiscal balance 0.03   2.32** 0.06%  -0.09%  0.07%  0.02%  -0.02  -1.79*        
External debt 0.00  -0.23         0.00   0.21        
D_Moody -0.21  -1.39         -0.09  -0.87        
D_Fitch -0.02  -0.27         -0.05  -0.45        
Co & Y dummies Yes           Yes          
 Pseudo R2 28.15%  # Obs. 4,412  Pseudo R2 26.66%  # Obs. 4493 
Panel B - Full sample in case of 1-month linkage                       
BANKUPNO_1 0.15 
  0.76         -0.44  -2.03** 1.66%  2.49%  -1.36%  -1.13% 
BANKUPNO_2 0.67 
  3.30*** 1.28%  -1.92%  1.41%  0.51%  -0.65  -1.63        
BANKDNNO_1 -0.10 
 
-0.47         0.58   3.22*** 2.23%  -3.34%  1.83%  1.51% 
BANKDNNO_2 -0.07  -0.24         1.26   7.34*** 4.81%  -7.21%  3.94%  3.27% 
SovRat -0.06  -1.55 
        -0.10  -2.92*** 0.32%  0.48%  -0.26%  -0.22% 
GPD per capita -0.01  -1.24         0.00  -0.14        
GDP growth -0.03  -0.69         0.00   0.06        
Inflation 0.01   0.35         0.01   0.30        
Current acc bal. 0.04   0.99         -0.03  -0.98        
Fiscal balance 0.03   1.78*         -0.02  -1.13        
External debt -0.01  -0.46         0.00   0.16        
D_Moody -0.29  -1.76*         -0.13  -1.09        
D_Fitch -0.15  -0.91         -0.14  -1.10        
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Co & Y dummies Yes           Yes          
  Pseudo R2 31.76%   # Obs.   3421   Pseudo R2 31.45%   # Obs.   3501 
Notes:  The table reports the results of the ordered probit estimations with robust standard errors by using pooled rating data from S&P, Moody’s, and Fitch with respect to two different linkage 
rules. Panel A and Panel B show the regression results for the sample in case of applying 1-month and 2-month linkage rule, respectively. The dependent variable is SUP (SDN), which equals either 
0, or 1, or 2 if the sovereign rating of a European country i is upgraded (downgraded) by 0, 1, or 2 or more notches in month t, respectively. BANKUPNO_1 (BANKUPNO_2) is a dummy variable 
that is set to 1 if the number of a European country’s bank rating upgrades up to 3 months prior to month t is equal to one (more than one), and 0 otherwise. BANKDNNO_1 (BANKDNNO_2) is a 
dummy variable that is set to 1 if the number of a European country’s bank rating downgrades up to 3 months prior to month t is equal to one (more than one), and 0 otherwise. SovRat is the 
numerical sovereign rating from the previous month based on the 20-point rating scale. The independent macroeconomic variables are GDP per capita, GDP growth, inflation rate, current account 
balance, fiscal balance and external debt (as defined in Table 1, Panel C). To control for differences across CRAs, D-Fitch (D-Moody) is set to 1 if Fitch (Moody's) assigns the respective ratings. 
Thus, S&P is used as the reference agency. Dummy variables of respective countries (Co) and years (Y) are also included. We further estimate and report the impact of each variable on the 
probability of a rating change (marginal effect), but only for variables with coefficients that are significant at least at the 5% level. The estimates of the two threshold parameters are significant at the 
1% level in all cases, and are not shown in the table. Asterisks indicate significance at the 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% (***) level, respectively. 
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Appendix A: Ordered probit estimation results with Eq. (1) and Eq. (2) for the crisis period and post-crisis period (only for peer-review) 
  SUP   SDN 
 Coef.   t-value Marginal Effects   Coef.   t-value Marginal Effects 
        
Avr 
|Chg|   0   1   2 ≤         
Avr 
|Chg|   0   1   2 ≤ 
Panel A - Crisis period (Jan 2009 - Dec 2012)                   
BANKUPNO_1 NA 
          NA          
BANKUPNO_2 NA 
          NA          
BANKDNNO_1 0.71 
  1.23         0.14   0.71        
BANKDNNO_2 -4.82 
 -6.66*** 0.97%  1.45%  -0.41%  -1.04%  0.75   4.75*** 4.75%  -7.12%  3.38%  3.74% 
SovRat -0.09 
 -1.34         -0.10  -8.24*** 0.61%  0.91%  -0.43%  -0.48% 
GPD per capita -0.29  -2.17** 0.06%  0.09%  -0.03%  -0.06%  0.00   0.12        
GDP growth -0.03  -0.21         -0.01  -0.35        
Inflation NA           NA          
Current acc bal. NA           NA          
Fiscal balance 0.07   1.53         0.01   1.82*        
External debt -0.11  -3.19*** 0.02%  0.03%  -0.01%  -0.02%  0.00   0.17        
D_Moody -5.30  -6.07*** 1.07%  1.60%  -0.45%  -1.15%  0.01   0.12        
D_Fitch -1.32  -1.72*         -0.14  -1.09        
Co & Y dummies Yes           Yes          
 Pseudo R2 48.86%  # Obs. 1,835  Pseudo R2 15.28%  # Obs. 1940 
Panel B - Post-crisis period (Jan 2013 - Dec 2016)                        
BANKUPNO_1 0.33   1.33         -0.23  -0.79        
BANKUPNO_2 0.61   2.75*** 1.54%  -2.31%  1.67%  0.64%  -4.05  
-
19.32*** 12.33%  18.50%  -13.16%  -5.34% 
BANKDNNO_1 0.02   0.09         0.09   0.37        
BANKDNNO_2 0.34   1.44         0.61   2.64*** 1.84%  -2.76%  1.96%  0.80% 
SovRat -0.07  -3.15*** 0.17%  0.25%  -0.18%  -0.07%  -0.08  -3.30*** 0.23%  0.35%  -0.25%  -0.10% 
GPD per capita 0.00  -0.40         0.00  -0.38        
GDP growth NA  
 
        NA  
 
       
Inflation -0.30  -2.03** 0.75%  1.12%  -0.81%  -0.31%  -0.05  -0.58        
Current acc bal. NA  
 
        NA  
 
       
Fiscal balance 0.00  -0.43         0.00  -0.45        
External debt 0.01   1.85*         0.01   1.21        
D_Moody -0.24  -1.01         -0.26  -1.14        
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D_Fitch -0.05  -0.22         0.10   0.49        
Co & Y dummies Yes           Yes          
  Pseudo R2 14.09%   # Obs.   1244   Pseudo R2 16.35%   # Obs.   1252 
The table reports the results of the ordered probit estimations (Eq. (1) and Eq. (2)) with robust standard errors using pooled rating data from S&P, Moody’s, and Fitch. Panel A shows the results 
for the crisis period (2009-2012), while Panel B shows the results for the post-crisis period (2013-2016). The dependent variable is SUP (SDN), which equals either 0, or 1, or 2 if the sovereign 
rating of a European country i is upgraded (downgraded) by 0, 1, or 2 or more notches in month t, respectively. BANKUPNO_1 (BANKUPNO_2) is a dummy variable that is set to 1 if the 
number of a European country’s bank rating upgrades up to 3 months prior to month t is equal to one (more than one), and 0 otherwise. BANKDNNO_1 (BANKDNNO_2) is a dummy variable 
that is set to 1 if the number of a European country’s bank rating downgrades up to 3 months prior to month t is equal to one (more than one), and 0 otherwise. SovRat is the numerical sovereign 
rating from the previous month based on the 20-point rating scale. The independent macroeconomic variables are GDP per capita, GDP growth, inflation rate, current account balance, fiscal 
balance and external debt (as defined in Table 1, Panel C). To control for differences across CRAs, D-Fitch (D-Moody) is set to 1 if Fitch (Moody's) assigns the respective ratings. Thus, S&P is 
used as the reference agency. Dummy variables of respective countries (Co) and years (Y) are also included. We further estimate and report the impact of each variable on the probability of a 
rating change (marginal effect), but only for variables with coefficients that are significant at least at the 5% level. The estimates of the two threshold parameters are significant at the 1% level in 
all cases, and are not shown in the table. Where no coefficients are reported, there were insufficient observations for the respective independent variable. 
Asterisks indicate significance at the 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% (***) level, respectively. 
 
